Introduction
Perhaps the most crucial condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the current New Zealand Labour Court is that the issue(s) before it must relate to, or affect, the interest(s) or conduct of a "worker" or a coll~tivity of "workers". "Worker" is a statutory term defined with minor variations in enactments including the Labour Relations Act 1987, (referred to in this article as "the LR Act" or "the Act") which confer jurisdiction on the Labour Court In spite of the liberal definitions of the term "worker", the Labour Court and its predecessors have decided for reasons which are by no means clear, to limit the meaning of the term to the common law understanding of "servant" or "employee". One may object to this approach not only on the ground that it is contrary to certain long-observed rules of statutory construction, but aJso because of certain sociolegal developments which have so far characterised the exercise of jurisdiction by industrial tribunals in New Zealand.
Before going further, it is important to know that the current meaning has had a negative consequence for the size of the working population which has actually benefited from the jurisdiction of these tribunals. Instead of augmenting, the current meaning has diminished this size. If the policy behind modem industrial dispute legislation such as the LR Act can be said to be contrary to this development, then it is suggested that a serious problem exists in modem New Zealand regarding the current meaning of the term "worker".
In New Zealand, as in other countries, an institutional specialization in industrial relations and law is developing. Our age is witness to an increasing arrogation to industrial tribunals (at the present time, the Labour Court), of the competence to determine industrial relations issues, to either the total or partial exclusion of other tribunals in modem society. While the course of this development is yet to be charted fully in the academic literature, (Vranken and Hince, 1988, pp.112-113) it is clear that it is a product of certain recent legislative and judicial rationalisation. Recent legislative changes have effected, in particular, the abolition of certain well-entrenched industrial 62 lsaacus Adzoxornu relation s institutions, amongst which the Aircrew Industry Tribunal, the Agricultural Tribunal and the Waterfront Industry Tribunal are perhaps the most prominent (Szakats, 1980; 1989, pp.22-24 ) . The consequence of this has been an unprecedented and accelerated expansion of the jurisdiction of the current Labour Coun (Szakats, 1988, pp.311-314) . Also , some recent decisions of the higher courts have accentuated and accelerated the rate of institutional specialisation in industrial relations and law. In NZ Baking Trades Employees Industrial Union v General Foods Corporation (NZ) Ltd, ([1985] 2 NZLR 110) and NZ Labourers' Union v Fletcher Challenge Ltd, ([1988] 1 NZLR 520), the Court of Appeal decided that although the regular courts and industrial tribunals may exercise certain concurre nt jurisdictions, in a proceeding or cause in which there is a "serious" industrial iss ue to be tried, it will best serve the public interest if the regular courts abdicate their jurisdiction 1n order to enable an industrial tribunal to try the iss ue in at least the first in stance (sec also Elg in v Newman , High Court, 1989, CP 770/88 ([1986] 2 NZLR 43 1), not onl y did the Co urt of Appeal refrain from formulating certain implied terms in the contracts of employme nt in iss ue, it was also content to arrogate this responsibility to the then Arbitratio n Court to be exercised in appropriate cases.
What both legislative innovations and judicial pronounceme nts seem to have achieved in recent times is to recog nise the c urrent Labour Co urt, in particular, as the most compete nt institution in mode m soc iety to dec ide industrial law iss ues. The question, "who is a worker?" 1s essentially a questi on of industrial law , and as such the Labour Court is the most qual1ficd institution in modem society to decide it. If, therefore, there is today, as we stro ngly s uggest, a cri sis in the meaning assigned to this fundam e ntal concept of modem industrial law -the "worker" -by the Labour Court, it is of the most profo und conseque nce fo r a significant sec tion of Ne w Zealand indus trial law and relations. This alo ne will justify any effort to drag this iss ue out of the Labour Court room into the public are na for a wider consideratio n than is the case now.
2. Dressing the "worker" in the garb of the "servant" Industrial tribunals and the literal rule of statutory construction Il is surprisin g to see how quickl y o ur indu strial tribunals' acceptance of tried and trusted canons of s t.atutory interpretatio n e vaporate into thin air when the y arc called upon to interpret the statJtory term "worke r". In New Zealand , courts have accepted the literal or pl ain mca n1ng rule as the "ele me ntary and fundam e ntal pnnc iple" of statuto ry construction The learned judge on this occasion applied the plain meaning rule as he did in 2 other decisions (1989, CLC 37/89; 1989, CLC 53/89 
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It is against this background that we shall argue Lhat whenever Parliament has chosen the term 11 WOrker" as opposed to the term "employee") it has defined the former broadly to include a limitless category of working people. Statutory definitions of "worker" mean what they say. They have not sought to limit the identity of the "worker" to a person who is engaged for work under a contract of service.
Statutory de fin it ions of "worker"
The thesis that "worker" is broadly defined in New Zealand sta tutes is s upported by the definitions proffered in Section 2 of both the Minimum Wage Act 1983, and the Wages Protection Act 1983, for example. According to the former:
Means any person of any age employed by an employer to do any work for hire or reward; and (b)
Includes a homeworker.
The Wages Protection Act's version is:
'Worker', means any person in any manner employed in any service or work for wages, and. in relation to any employer, means any worker employed by that employer.
None of these definitions has sought to limit the meaning of the term to any contractual classification of a person's work. The defin~tion of "bush worker" is similarly broad. It means "any person engaged, whether on his own account as a contractor, or as an employee in a bush undertaking" (s2(1), Bush Workers Act 1945). The inclusion in this definition of the word "employee"
has not placed any limitation on the meaning of the term for 2 main reasons. First, it is 64 Isaacus Adzoxornu clear that the definition embraces both the common law "independent contractor" and "employee" . Second, as we shall argue below, whenever statute uses the term "employee", as opposed to "worker", it has defined the former in terms of a contract of • service.
The Holidays Act 1981 has also chosen liberal words to define the term for its own purposes. "Worker" in section 2(1) of the Act means:
Any person o f any age o f either sex employed by any employer to do any work fo r hire or reward; and includes an apprentice and any o ther pers on whose con trac t of employm ent requires him to learn or to be taught any occupation ... From this definiti on, it is clear that the meaning of the term "worker" is unfettered by any ambiguo us words; rather it extends, wherever possible , to include an apprentice or any other person whose contract requires him or her to learn a trade or an occupation (see section 2, Agric ultural Workers Act 1977).
Some repealed statu tes went further than this to provide an extended definition of the term . The purpose of such an extended definition was to expressly expand, rather than to restrict, the categories of persons that may be regarded as "workers". For example , "in order to remove any do ubt" as to the meanin g of the term , section 2(3) of both the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1954 (hereafter referred to as the IC&A Ac t), and the Industrial Relations Act 1973 (hereafter referred to as the IR Act), expressly went on to state that the term applied regardless of whe ther a re latio nship was that of "master and servant" or "em pi oyer and employee". The current Holidays Act 198 1 has continued this tradi tion by providing in its sec tion 2(3) that
For the purposes of the definition of the term "worker " in sub-section (1) of this section, every person who is wholly or m ainly engaged in procuring proposals or contracts of industrial life assurance or in collecting industrial life assurance premiums for any person, firm, compan y, socie ty, association, or corporation carrying on industrial life assur ance business and is remunerated wholly or partly by fees or commission shall be deem ed to be a wo rker em ployed by that person, firm, company, society, association, or corporation, whe ther or not the relationship between them is that of master and servant This ex tended defini tion also has no t limited the meaning of "worker" to a person engaged under a contrac t of employment or service, or who is engaged as a "servant" or "employee". Il would appear, therefore, fro m the plain or o rdinary meanings of the statutory definiti ons examined so far that the s tatutory concept of "wo rker" is much broader than the common law servant or "employee".
The most proximate New Zealand legislation under which the Labour Court exerc ises its specialist j uri sdiction is the LR Act. This Act, like its predecessors the IC&A Act and the IR Ac t, has defin ed the term "worker" very liberall y. Under sec tio n 2( 1) of the LR Act, "worker" (a) Means any person of any age employed by an employer to do any work for hire or reward; and (b) Includes -(i) A homeworker; or (ii) A person intending to work.
Unlike its predecessors, the LR Act has no t given the term any extended definition.
As we have already observed, the extended definiti ons prov ided in the predecessor A cts expressly incl uded in the meaning of "worker" relationships outside those of the common law "master and servant" or "employer and employee". A case may therefore be made that the absence of an extended defin iti on of the term in the LR Act may convey the intention of Parliament to limit the meaning of the term to the common law concept of a "servant" or "employee". However, this argument can only be sustained if the plain or ordinary meanings of the words of the statute have failed to indicate the real intention of Parliament. It would appear that the words of the statute arc clear enough to bring out the parliamentary intent. In spite of the absence of an extended definition of the term "worker", the LR Act is innovative in two respects. First, it has defined the term to include "a homeworker". To belong to this category, a person must be:
engaged, employed or contracted by any other person (in the course of that other person's trade or business) to do work for that other person in a dwelling house (not being work on that dwelling house or on fixtures, fittings or furniture in it); and includes a person who is in substance so engaged, employed, or contracted notwithstanding that the form of the contract between the parties is technically that of vendor and purchaser (Section 2( 1 ).
The inclusion of "homeworker" in the definition of "worker" expands, rather than contracts the categories of those who may be regarded as workers for the purposes of the AcL The second innovation introduced by the LR Act is the inclusion in the definition of the term "a person intending to work". Before the LR Act came into operation, the Labour Court and its predecessors limited the meaning of the term to persons who were in "actual employment." Because of this, access to the tribunals was denied persons whose contracts of employment were terminated before they could actually commence work (Wilson [1980] It would be quite wrong. in view of lhe altered definition in the statute, for this court to continue to countenance a situation under which an employer could resile with impunity. so far as personal grievance remedies are concerned, from a concluded contract of employment, on the sole ground that the performance of the contract has not yet commenced. The law should not work in a capricious fashion. There IS obviously a defect in the earlier statutory position which has now been cured by Parliament, and deli bcrately so.
Insofar as this decision has sought to recognise the expanded meaning of the term "worker", it is commendable.
The contrast in the definition of "employee:
It would be difficult to sustain from the statutory definitions of "worker" examined so far that Parliament intended the term to reflect a movement away from the socially unacceptable and discredited expression "servant". It has been suggested in some sections of the academic literature that because the terms "master" and "servant" carry undemocratic and slavery connotations, it seems more appropriate to replace them with "employer" and "employee" (Szakats, 1988. pp.3,9; Mathieson, 1970, p.1 ) . This switch in terminology will not, however, affect the common law test of an employer and employee relationship; which is a determination that a person worked or works under a contractofsennce. It is important to note that the definitions examined so far are concerned with the "worker", not the "employee". It cannot be argued that Parliament lacked the sophistication to distinguish between the 2 terms. Not only has Parliament, in some 66 Isaac us Adzoxorn u other statutes, clearly preferred the term "employee" to "worker", but whenever it has preferred the former term, it has been consistent enough to limit its definition .to a person who works under a contract of service, as opposed to a contract for servtces. Two examples will suffice here. Section 2 of the Accident Compensation Act defines "employee" in part as "any person who has engaged to work or works ... under a contract of service or apprenticeship". In the Equal Pay Act 1972, an "employee" is:
[A]ny person who has entered into or works under a contract of service or apprenticeship with an emplo yer , whether by way of manual labour, clerical work, or any o ther work or effort whatsoever .. . These definiu ons are consistent with Court of Appeal authority in the NZ Educational Institute case ([1 98 1] 1 NZLR 538) that in order to determine who is an employee, the test to apply is whethe r or not the person works or worked under a contract of service.
Industrial tribunals and the meaning of "worker"
We have alread y demonstrated that the Labour Court and its predecessors have accepted the policy position tha t words in a statute should be give n their ordinary meaning unless this wo uld lead to abs urdity, injustice, irrati o nality, hardship, etc., or would be inconsistent with the intention of Parliame nt. It would also appear, from at least Judge Goddard's dec ision in the Elms Motor Lodge case, that the LR Ac t has used "clear words"
to defin e th e term "wo rke r". It wo uld follow log ically from these consideratio ns, therefore, th at in dustrial tribunal s sho uld , at least initially , derive the meaning of the te rm from the plain meaning of t.he words. This, however, has not been the case . In the case of ]arden, Judge Thompson of the Court of Arbitration held that:
The appellant to succeed in her aclion mus t be a "worker" under the ... Act .. . . It is no t in the least clear fro m the definiti on quo ted by the learned judge how the nollon of a "conLrac t o f e mployment " fo und its way into that definition. Altho ug h judges of New Zealand indusLrial tri bunals have stated the proble m diffe rentl y in the cases, the effect has remai ned the same: that is, in order to determine whe ther a person is, or was a worker the relevant question is whe the r the person works or worked under a contrac t of service, as opposed to a contrac tfor services, or, whether there was between the parties a m~ter a nd servant relattonshJp , or an e mployer and employee relationship (sec, e.g., the Dyer [1980] ACJ 29 1; Uncle's Foodbar [1981] ACJ 57 1; and Tony Chimes There is no j udgemen t o n record in w hich either the present Labour Court o r any of Its predecessors has purposively explored the possibdtty, tf no t the desirability, o f introducing a divergence in the meanings of the st.atutory "worker", and the common law "servant" or "employee". Instead, they have all proceded on the bas is that the term s mean o ne and the same thing . Accordin g to S1 akats ( 1988, p .2 1) the wo rd "hire" in the de fintll on "suggests a narrow construcllon exc lud tng independent contractors ." This v1cw is hardly defensible
The re ts onl y one deciston tn whic h the atte mpt was made to cons1der t.he meaning of the words "hire or reward''. The unusual facts of the ]arden case ([ 1970] BA 4982) whic h "Worker", Labour Court and common law 67 made this possible were that Mrs Lipsham (the appellant), worked as a telephonist for the respondent's taxi business, in consideration of her husband being given some shares in the business after the respondent had acquired and paid for 3 more taxis. The appellant's husband was at the time the only driver and manager of the business. Her husband was dismissed before he could acquire any shares in the business. An action was brought on behalf of Mrs Lipsham for unpaid wages under the relevant award. Judge Thompson of the Court of Arbitration held that there was no enforceable contract of employment between Mrs Lipsham and the respondent. Rather it was a condition of Mr Lipsham's contract of employment that Mrs Lipsham should attend to the telephone; and that the performance of this duty was a domestic arrangement between the Lipshams, which could not be enforced against the respondent. Mrs Lipsham was not, therefore, in the ordinary usc of language, employed for "hire". 1 udgc Thompson went on to hold that to be employed as a "worker" under the IC&A Act, a person must be engaged or employed for "hire or reward ". According to His Honour, these words suggested consideration in the form of money, or something which could be readily translated into money. Furthermore, this monetary consideration must be payable to the employee and not to a third party. His Honour was prepared to hold so although he observed that a valid contract could assign benefiLS under it to a third party. He, however, held that "we are [here] not concerned with contraclS generally but with the question whether a contract of this type can create the status of "worker" in a person who herself takes no benefit". According to His Honour, injustice would arise if the general principles of contract law were extended to employment contracts under the Act. For present purposes, one other remark made obiter by His Honour, which was totally inconsistent with the main decision in the case, requires our attention. He said at one stage that [T] here may be a contract of service creating the relationship of master and servant which does not create the relationship of "employer" and "worker" under the Act. This is not an unreasonable conclusion (p.4985).
If His Honour's conclusion in this respect is correct in law, then there is support for the view that the term "worker" under the Act is not synonymous with the term "servant" or "employee". "Worker" under the Act may include, but it is by no means confined to, the common law "servant" or "employee''. This will be so even if the words "hire" and "reward" arc construed to mean monetary consideration for work payable only to the person engaged to work.
It is not the contention of this article that the term "worker" is not capable of being construed as a person employed under a contract of service. It is rather that there is nothing in the LR Act in particular to ju stify the narrower construction which New Zealand industrial tribunals have placed on the term . There may exist some policy considerations which justify the narrower construction of the term. However, it is regrettable to observe that our industrial tribunals have not spclt these out. It is desirable in the face of the liberal definition of the term that any decision of the courts to limit the term to the common law servant must be supported by some sort of explanation. So far, our industrial tribunals have not explained to us why "any person of any age employed by an employer to do any work for hire or reward" should mean "any person employed under a contract of service". Such an explanation is needed urgently in order to convince son1e working people why Parliament has excluded them from the enjoyment of certain rights and protection provided under modern labour protection legislation such as the LR Act. Such an explanation will also bring the procedures and practices of our industrial tribunals closer to those normally applied by courts of justice in the interpretation of statutory provisions.
. If the view that the Labour Court and its predecessors have for all these years Incorrectly construed the statutory term "worker" is sustainable, then it will be difficult to understand why some academic writers have given their tacit recognition, if not acceptance, to this practice (Geare, 1988, pp.65 -74; Brooks, 1978, pp.l72-174) . Although Mathieson has hit the nail on the head when he notes that there is virtually no authority in New Zealand law for the fundamental proposition that "a man or woman not working under what the common law would recognise as a contract of service is not a "worker" for the purposes of [the statutory] definition", he nevertheless comes to the conclusion that the proposition is implicit in New Zealand law (Mathieson, 1970, p.3) .
What these wrilCrs have succeeded in doing is to condone the confusion which our industrial tribunals have created be tween the statutory "worker" and the common law "employee". This academic condonation of a statutory construction which is patently incorrect is Inconsiste nt with the views expressed by overseas writers about the understandin g of the modem day "worker" in jurisdic tions such as Australia (Merrit, 1982, p .59) and Engla nd (R1deout, 1983, pp.l6-17 ; Elias et . al, 1980, p .337; Hepple and O'Higg ins, 1989, pp. l -42). 3. Policy considerations and the construction of "worker"
As In tim ated tn the preced ing secti on, judicial ingenuity has succeeded in indicating the limits of the application of the plain or ordinary meaning rule of statutory construcuon. There is the we ll -recognised pos ition that some instances will justify a departure fro m this rul e. On e of the residual rules o f statutory construc tion is what is known in both th e judicial a nd acade mic j urisprudence as the "mi schief" rule , or the rule in 1/eydon's case (( 1854) 3 Co Rep 7a). We have already seen an application of this rule in Auckland 1/otel, etc. , IUH' v Air NZ Ltd. ([1986] ACJ 218) . BrieOy, what the rule de mands o f the court is fo r the latter to go behind the ordinary words of the statute in ord er to disco ver the "misc hief ' whic h the Act of Parliame nt soug ht to remedy . It requires a search for parliamentary inte nt through an investigation of the object of the Act of Parl!ame nt. The rule proceeds on the assumption that every Ac t of Parliament was purposively inLrod uccd to rec tify a n undesirable soc ial state of affairs; that is, all Acts of Parliament arc remedial in one way or the o ther. After the object or objects of the Ac t has or have been discovered , the court is the n required to construe the provisions of the Act so as to s uppress the m ischief and/or advance th e remedy. The Ac ts Interpre tatio n Ac t 1924 of New Zea land has codt fied this rule in its sec tion 5U) in the foll o wing tenns: Every Ac t, and every provis ion or enac tment thereof, shall be deemed rem edial, whe ther its immed iate purport is to di rec t the d oin g o f any thing Parli am e nt deems to be fo r the public good, or to preven t or pun ish the do mg of anything it deems con trary to the public good, and shall accordingly recei ve such fair, large and l iberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attai nment of the obJeCt of the Act and o f suc h pro vision or enactment according to its true intent, meaning and spirit Thus, in 1/ellaby Shortland Ltd v Weir ([ 1976] 2 NZLR 355), a very strong Court of A ppeal held tha t Si nce the Fac ton es Ac t 1946 was inLroduced for the pro tec ti on and benefit of fac tory worke rs, Parlia me nt was, therefore, more like ly to ha ve inte nded the more gene rous constru cti on of its provistons from th e po int of view of workers.
The major thesis to be arg ued in thi s sec tio n of the paper is that aside from the legitimate observa tion that 1nd ustnal tribunal s in New Zealand have dec ided to read into the defini tjon of "worker" words whtc h c learly do no t ex ist, they have also failed, regrettably, to a11ow the ratio nale behind the LR Ac t, in partic ular, to innucnce the meaning of the term.
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The "mischief" behind modern New Zealand protective labour legislation Opinion is divided amongst commentators on the question of whether the IR Act made any changes to its predecessors, the IC&A Acts. While writers such as Seidman (1984) were prepared to observe that theIR Act was "the first major revision" since 1894, others such as Woods (1974) and Gcare (1976) , were of the view that the Act was nothing but a rehash of the previous Acts. However, in another context, Gcare (1988) was of the opinion that the 1987 LR Act represented "at the very least a significant improvement over the past legislation". W c shall avoid taking sides in this debate. The primary concern in this section is to determine the extent (if any) to which either stability or change in the rationale for modem industrial legislation has particular consequences for the definition, if not the meaning, of the term "worker" in the LR Act. Even in those early years, New Zealand legislation avoided the use of the term "servant", preferring instead the term "workman". There was no uniform definition of this term) although 2 contrasting definitions were dominant. Section 2 of the Truck Act 1891, typified the first. A 11 Workman" was:
any person in any manner employed in work of any kind or in manual labour, whether under the age of twenty-one years or above that age.
The second type of definition appeared in the Employers' Liability Act 1882, New Zealand's fust industrial accident compensation legislation. This Act limited the meaning of the term to persons employed under a "contract of service or contract personally to execute any work or labour". The Em players' Liability Act was the only exception; the others merely required that a person be employed either "in any manner'' or "in work of any kind". The Employers' Liability Act carried this definition through to 1982. The preferred term in the Accident Compensation Act 1982 is "employee"; however, the requirement that a person be employed under a It contract of service'' has remained.
Distinctive characteristics of Workers' Compensation legislation
Why did the legislature limit the meaning of the term in the Employers' Liability Act 1882 to a contract of service, but expand it in the other laws? The explanation is not hard to find. It lay in the earlier common law's preparedness to understand the master and servant relationship in terms of a domestic arrangement (see e.g., Blackstone, 1978, p.422; Kahn-Freund, 1977) and also, in the rights and duties which this scheme of things imposed on the parties (Selznick, 1983, Chap 4).
Certain incidents flowed from this earlier master and servant relationship. The master enjoyed the right to chastise the servant (Blackstone, 1978, p.426) . The master had the right to command the servant, and the servant to obey. The contract could be specifically enforced and the servant was liable to be punished if he or she left the employment prematurely. The master also had a proprietary interest in the servant's services (Blackstone, 1978, p.429) . In return for all these, the master was under a legal duty to ensure the moral and phystcal well-being of the servant (Selznick, 1983, pp.128-129) .
The master was under a duty to provide the servant with medical, surgical and nursing treatment if the servant became ill or injured in the course of employment (Morris, 1946, p.18; Schouler, 1870, pp.616-618) . As a general rule, the master could not discharge a servant for an incurable illness, and in some jurisdictions, the law penalized a master who turned away a servant who had not completely recovered from illness. Selznick suggests that this obligation of the master derived from the common law right of the master to chastise the servant or apprentice. He also suggests that this common law obligation applied where the relation ship between the master and servant was "more intimate", "more endunng", or "close and lasting" ( 1983, pp.l28, 129) . What is not clear from the authorities is whether the master's responsibility for the general welfare of the servan t embraced also a duty to compensate the servant for injury sustained by the latter in the course of the employment. It would appear this was not the case in England, although there was a limited legal enforcement of such an obligation under one 1846 Act (9 & 10 V tct.). The operation of this law was limited because it was restricted to compensation for "persons killed" through a "wrongful act, neglect or default" of the "wrong-doer". Dissatisfaction with this law led to the introduction in 1880 of the Employers' Liability Act (Cap 42, 43 & 44 Viet.), which sought to make payment of compensation to injured servants or dependants of servants killed in the course of their employment compulsory, because it was the "magnanimity and liberality" of employer<;, rather than any enforceab le legal obligauon, which underwrote the whole gamut of industrial accidenLc; compensation at the time (NZ Parliamentary Debates, 1882, p.338).
Thts was one of the m1schiefs whtch the New Zealand Employers' Liability Act 1882 sought to remedy; that is, to make the payment of compensation for industrial accidents compulsory on the part of employers. It also sought to abolish the doctrine of common employment-"that repu lsive law, one so con Lrary to every feeling of natural justicell (NZ Parliamentary Debates 1882, p.339), and to limtt the amount of compensation to be paid to the sum which the servant would have earned in 3 years. The New Zealand legislation followed closely the English Act of 1880. Because compensation for injury or accidents suffered by servants in the course of their employment could not be divorced from the old common law obligation of the master to care for the servant tn both sickness and health, the law became applicable to a strict construction of a master and servant relationship. lL therefore became imperative for legi slators in both England and New Zea land to create the "workman" in the image of the "servant" (Cap 90 38 & 39 Viet.). The res Lric tion of indusLrial injury compensation to the "servant" in modem legi<;lalion ts, therefore, historically informed. If this explanation is tenable, then the vtew tha t indusLrial injunes compen sation is limited to "servants" or "employees" because "it would be impossible to detect abuse or fraud where a person was self-employed" would be largely discredited (Cane, 1987, p.327) . The better view would be that no such duty was owed to the self-employed at common law.
Lcgtslauon provtding for compensation for industrial acctdenLS may be differentiated from some other protecuve labour legtslalion in order to advance the understanding that in the Iauer cla\s of legislalton, the nature of protection and the recipient of this, arc likely to vary and embrace categories other than the "servant" or "employee". The Wages Protccuon Act 1983 (or 1ts historical ancestors the Truck Act 1891 and the Workmen's Wages Act 1893) IS primarily concerned with the wages whjch the worker has earned. The policy justiftcatton of wages protection leg t~lation IS to recognise and enforce the propnetary Interest of a person 1n his or her wages. A person has a proprietary interest in his or her wages not nccessan I y because he or she has been employed as a servant or emp loyee, but matnly because the wages have been earned by the person as a result of having been engaged for work (Blackstone, 1978, p.428) . The law's role in thi s respect, therefore, ts to enforce a contractual promtse by an employer to pay a worker certain "Worker", Labour Court and common law 71 wages in consideration of work done by the latter. In enforcing this contractual promise, the law has found it appropriate on certain occasions to also fix, not only the minimum rates to be paid for different kinds of labour services, but also the mode and periodicity of their payment. Thus, it can be seen that the law's role in the area of wages protection is likely to transverse the narrow interest of the "servant" or "employee" properly so-called, to encompass also other persons engaged to work for hire or reward under a variety of contractual arrangements.
From "individual" to "collective" labour protection.
New Zealand's first collective labour leg islation was the IC&A Act. We shall here rely substantially on the available research in order to provide some understanding of the policy considerations which informed the introduc tion of the first law. Writers are not unanimous on the question of whether or not the law has gone through any major changes since its introduction in 1894. However, one observation with which most writers will not disagree is this: whether or not the intent behind the first collective labour legislation was to eliminate "sweating",3 to encourage trade unionism (or even to create unionism) or to regulate wages (Vrankcn and Hincc, 1988, pp.108-113) , these cannot be regarded as ends in them selves. Rather, whether viewed individually or collectively, the various and sometimes paradoxical justifications discovered by writers for the introduction of legislation of this kind arc nothing but a means to certain significant ends -to reduce and also regulate, as far as possible, the incidence of industrial conflict In 1894, conciliation and compulsory arbitration was intended to avert what one member of the then Legislative Council described variously as "actual", "civil" and "labour" war (NZ Parliamentary Debates, 1894, p.3). In 1973, the law was intended to "bring to an end the unnecessary and con tinuing frustrdtions that we have suffered through needless strikes" (NZ Parliamentary Debates, 1973 , p.2768 . This justification for reform of the law did not change in 1986 (NZ Parliamentary Debates, 1987(a), pp.6429-6430) .
While the policy justification of collective labour legislation in New Zealand has remained the reduction and regulation of industrial conflict, some of the means of achieving this have varied from epoch to epoch. The changes which have so far characterised the role of the authoritative third-party court in particular have been studied by Vranken and Hince (1988, pp. l08-113) , and we shall not do the same here. Instead we will proceed lD determine how the "worker" was intended by the law-makers to play a part in the overriding quest to reduce and regulate industrial conflict.
Vranken and Hince observe that the individual worker's role has not been recognised as capable of making a significant contribution to the achievement of the broad purposes of industrial conflict regulation. The emphasis in all of the laws has been on "collectivities" -trade unions -and how to make these effective and responsible entities capable of committing them ideologically to the system. The motto, therefore, must have been this: seck ye first effective and responsible trade unions and the interest of the individual worker shall be protected. Writing about the IC&A Act, Vranken and Hince note that [T] he deduction [is] that the ... Act, and the activity of the Court, regardless of the original prime intent, had resulted in a centrality of registered organisations, and that such organisations were prescribed a role in the arbitral process. We can therefore assert that the emphasis was on the needs of the collective and that the protection of the individual by the conciliation and arbitration law and I the Labour Court was to be bro ught through the protection of the collective (p. l11) .
A slight variation appears in this theme later when the co-authors observe that "the system was designed to benefit the whole community, individual rights were to be protected via the collective" (p.l11). This, according to the co-authors, remained the philosophy up to 1968. Legislative amendment in 1970, (s 179 (1) IC&A Act) and a major revision in 1973 (IR A ct) introduced what is now known as the personal grievance procedures, under which the Court was given an expanded jurisdiction to hear and determine workplace conflicts between employers and employees. One would have expected this inn ovation to have resulted in a de-emphasisation of the interests or role of the collective in the indu strial relations system . This was, however, not the case. "In general II, observ e Vranken and H in ce (p.l17), II workers could not be parties to proceedings under the IR Act and a union could only represent those who were eligible to join it under its existing membership rule". A s Judge William son once held:
As a broad general rule, an individual worker has no party status before this court under the Industnal Relatio ns Act. He may enforce various rights in the civil cou rls, but, generally speaking, his remedies in this court are available only at the su1t of his un10n or an Inspector of Awards (Allfrey , [1983] ACJ 131 t 134 ).
The rationale for th1s "broad general rule" was stated by the learned judge as giving uni ons the right to determine whether a grievance had substance which warranted ventilation. The on ly circum stance in which an individual worker could proceed to the court was where the union had failed to act, or to act promptly to bring the grievance to resolution. It goes without say in g that a non-union member had no right to invoke the personal grievance procedures under the IR Act.
Rev iston of the law in 1987 did nothing to reduce the innuence of the collective in industrial disputes. R ather, the law-makers reiterated the desire to "promote the formation of more effecu ve and accountable workers' unions and employers' organisations" (NZ Parliamentary D ebates, 1987(a), p.6426). The emphasis was on "groups of workerstl rather than the individual worker. Unions were given the right to detennine their own objects and membership rules, subjec t only to controls to promote membership participation, democracy and accountable management. Again, access to the personal grievance procedures became the property of th e uni on. The emphasis here was on union membership. A slight sh1 ft occurred: an individual worker not covered by an award could nevertheless rcqu ire the union to inv oke the personal grievance procedure on his or her behalf, provided the worker jomed the union before the submi ssion of the grievance. An individual worker, co uld however, by-pass the unton, but only in a limited number of circum stances. Again, the law-makers' hope was that the individual's interest should be protected through that of effecll ve and responsible unions. In so far as this was true , there is a considerable substance of truth in some parliamentary criticisms of the Labour
Relations Bill that the Bill was too weighted m favour of trade union s and discriminated against the In terests of indtviduaJ workers in personal grievance claim s. A s such the Bill deni ed to indi vidual workers certain fundam ental human ri ghts (NZ Parliamentary Debates, 1987(b), pp.8802, 8924 ) .
It is against this background that the definiti on of "worker " in the LR Act must be exam ined. It would appear that because the rauonale had remained the desire to establish effecti ve and responsible un1ons as a panacea for the mcreas ing incidence of largely unreg ulated industrial disputes, the law-makers dtd not bother themselves with the delicate question of qual1 fication requiremenL'i for trade un1on membership. Unions were given the right to formulate thctr own membership rules so long as these promoted democratic participation and accoun Lable organ isauon.
While this is hardly the place to go into a detailed discussion of union membership rules, it is, nevertheless, important to observe that the provisions of the LR Act raise a very strong presumption in favour of wider, rather than more restricted, trade union membership. Because this is so, the Act has refrained from specifying any eligibility qualifications for trade union members except perhaps the requirement that a potential trade union member must be a person engaged to work, or a person who intends to work. Two objects of the union membership provisions in the Act typify this presumption. Section 58( a) of the Act provides that:
While unions may provide for a wider membership. all persons working who fall within the coverage of a union membership rule have a right to join that union [emphasis added].
Under Section 58(e), moreover, an exemption from union membership may only be sought on the grounds of conscience or other deeply held personal conviction. Section 60 of the Act complements these provisions by stating that:
Subject to the provisions of this Act, every person who, by virtue of that person's work or intended work, is within the coverage of the membership rule of a union shall be entitled to be admitted to membership of the union and on application the union shall admit such a person to membership; and so far as the rules of any union are inconsistent with the provisions of this section they shall be null and void [emphasis added].
The italicised words in these provisions clearly indicate the intention of Parliament to extend the protections afforded under the Act to a variety of working people regardless of the contractual basis of their employment. The intent of the law-makers was to reduce and regulate industrial conflict through effective and responsible trade unions. The effectiveness of unions will derive from among other things, the numerical strength of their membership which, in tum, will generate sufficient resources, at both the personnel and financial levels, to enable unions to discharge their functions more efficiently and effectively. There must have been other justifications for expanding rather than restricting union membership: industrial conflict whether started by "employees" or "servantsn properly so-called, or by independent contractors, are disruptive of any industrial or economic production process. The creation of effective trade unions with tentacles stretched into many areas of the industrial production sector, will canalise most, if not all, industrial conflict into the rationalised system. The consequence of this will be increased specialisation, hence, increased efficiency, in the handling of a greater proportion of industrial conflict within the system.
It should now be clear that L~e Labour Court and its predecessors have paid little or no auention to the policy justifications behind collective labour legislation of this country in their efforts to determine the key question of who is a "worker" for the purposes of the Act. The law-makers were not interested in the question of whether a person works or intends to work as a "servant" or an independent contractor. Rather the interest was in the person as a potential participant in industrial conflict. Insofar as the person's work or intended work, makes him or her a potential industrial disputant, he or she will become subjected to the control of a trade union; the latter will then define and protect his or her interests. The absolute discretion conferred on unions to formulate and implement membership rules was intended to be exercised in a way which will bring as many working people as possible, regardless of the contractual basis of their employment, under the umbrella of the national industrial conflict process (Clark and Wedderburn, 1983, p.145) . The lesson which emerges from the understanding provided in this section is that it is union membership rules which make a person a "worker" for the purposes of the Act These rules are what industrial tribunals in New Zealand should be scrutinising.
lsaacus Adzoxornu
The paradox in industrial tribunals' decisions In one class of cases decided under the IR Act, the Labour Court and its predecessors were willing to recognise the right of unions to determine who to admit to membership; yet in another c~ass decided under the same Act they were unprepared to declare a person a "worker" for the purposes of the Act, although a union had treated the person as its member. In Greenwood v Keith Galloway Ltd ([ 1982] ACJ 41, 43) a personal grievance dispute, the Arbitration Court held obiter that We acknowledge too, that there is an argument that since the right to take personal grievance proceedings is vested in the union, the union should have the right to say who should be regarded as its member for the purpose of taking those proceedings.
This dictum was adopted and applied to the facts of Canterbury Clerical Workers IUW v Brady ([1986] ACJ 98, 102) where the same court held that if a union is prepared to accept ... a person under the age of eighteen years, who is not obliged to become a member of the union, but nonetheless has been 'under its wing' as a worker covered by the award which is serviced and applied by that union, then it should be entitled to do so.
An examination of 2 other cases will disclose the unwillingness of industrial tribunals to accept union membership rules as determinative of the question who is a "worker" for the purposes of the Act. In Agricultural Pilots' Assoc of NZ IUW v The Southland Aerial Co-operative Society Ltd, ([ 1985] ACJ 330), the grievant, whose initial contract of service with the society was terminated, nevertheless held himself available to fly the society's planes under a different arrangemenL He had remained a member of the union and attended all its annual general meetings. His employment was later terminated. The court held that although the factor of hi s continued membership of the union pointed to the existence of an employer-employee relationship, it could not attract any weight apart from the one that it provided him with occasions for meeting other pilots in a social interaction context. Accordingly, the Court denied him a "worker" status under the Act. The effect of this decision and many others is to deny to a unio n the right to say who should be regarded as i L' ) member. Similarly, in NZ h'orkers IUW v Wilkins ([ 1986] ACJ 227) where the relevant award covered the work of the grievan t, the Court nevertheless held that the grievant was not a .. worker" since he worked under a con tract for services and not one of service. Chief Judge Hom went further to observe in hi s judgment that:
We comment there arc and have been for many years items in successive awards which purport to extend the terms of awards to persons not bound in a master and servant relationship. There are deficiencies in this award which should be looked into (p.279).
It is submitted, in the light of what has been sa id so far, that the Court was not correct in this observation because the provisions of the Act did not restrict coverage of the terms of awards to the work of .. servants". The IR Act, hke the LR Act, was intended to be cons trued broadly so as to include as many working people as possible within its prov isions. Such an interpretation would have been consistent with at least judicial a uthority in the United Kingdom that to qualify as a .. worker" the test is whether a person has undertaken to perform "personall y'' any work in a contractual context (Broadbent v Crisp [1974] ICR 248; WGGB v BBC [1974] ICR 234). It is further submiued that for the purposes of the LR Act, it is a union, and not the Court, which is competent to make a person engaged or employed to do any work for hire or reward, or a person intending to work, a "worker". The Court's role is strictly limited to determining:
whether a union's membership rules arc inconsistent with the provisions of the Act; whether the union or the person so admitted as a member has met the criteria and procedure prescribed by the union's rules relating to admission to membership; whether the person so admitted as a member of the union was employed, or has intended to do any work for hire or reward; and whether the persons work or intended work is covered by the union's coverage rules.
The determination of the thira issue will not necessarily involve the determination of the issue of whether the person engaged was engaged as an "employee", or a "servant" or an independent contractor; or whether the person intends to work in any of the forgoing capacities. It will only become a live issue where a union's membership rule requires so. The Court's role is misconceived when it purports to decide any question outside those 4. It is in the light of this approach that Judge Palmer's Judgment in 2 recent cases (Denford, 1989, CLC 70/89; and Tan, 1989 , CLC 67/89) must be commended as seminal.
Conclusion
The understanding provided in this article has revealed one significant development in the law and practice of industrial relations in New Zealand, namely, an incorrect interpretation of the term "worker" in the LR Act and other enactments under which industrial tribunals have exercised their specialist jurisdictions. This development has occurred because of 2 main reasons. First, industrial tribunals have read into the clear statutory definitions of the term, "a contract of service," words which the definitions do not contain. Furthermore, they have limited the construction of the term to a person who works or worked under a contract of service. This is contrary to the elementary and fundamental rule of statutory construction that words in a statute should be given their ordinary meaning unless the result would lead to absurdity, irrationality, hardship, injustice, inconsistency, etc. New Zealand industrial tribunals have not shown that any of these results are likely to arise if the words of the statutory definitions of the term are given their ordinary or plain meanings. Second, industrial tribunals have failed to allow the policy considerations behind the enactments to influence the meaning which they have given the term. This approach directly contradicts section 5U) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924.
Dissatisfaction with this development is justifiable on a number of grounds. First, given that the current Labour Court, in particular, can only assume its specialist jurisdiction upon a finding that a party before it is a "worker" or a representative of a "worker" or a group of "workers", any meaning which the Court decides to give the term will necessarily have consequences for the size of the working population which can benefit from the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction. It is submitted that the development identified in this article has shrunk, rather than enlarged, the size of the working class that has so far benefited from the specialist jurisdiction and protection of our industrial tribunals. Social policy does not support this development. Second, the institutional specialisation which is rapidly taking place in the industrial relations system means that other institutions or courts are being increasingly deprived of the competence to determine the question "who is a worker?" for the purposes of industrial disputation under the LR Act and other enactments. One inevitable 7 6
Isaacus Ad zoxor n u consequence of institutional specialization is the increased bureaucratisation and differentiation of industrial disputes. Another is that decisions of the specialist institution will become less and less subject to review by, or appeal to, other courts or tribunals in society. A limited system of reviews and appeals exist under the LR Act It would appear, however, that so far, these have not affected decisions of our industrial tribunals in this crucial area. On the issue of appeals in particular, Section 312 of the LR Act will regulate the matter. The section provides that:
(1) Where any party to any proceedings under this Act is dissatisfied with any decision of the Labour Court ... as being erroneous in point of law, that party may appeal to the Court of Appeal by way of case stated for the opinion of that Court on a question of law only.
Although this right of appeal exists, its exercise has been restricted to decisions of the Labour Court on points of law. It is submitted that even if this provision can be invoked in relauon to the decisions of the Labour Court on the question "who is a worker?", it can only be invoked in a marginal number of cases. This is so because the Court and its predecessors have largely treated the application of their current crop, :.he "mixed" (or "mullipleff) and If totality" tests of a contract of service as a matter of fact rather than as a matter of law (Szakats, 1988, pp.26-31) .
While there arc direct statements in some of the judgments to this effect, the industrial tribunals have also heJd that these tests represent the "common sense approach of the reasonable person" (sec e.g. NZ Carpenters, etc, IUW v Construction Development Ltd 1989, CLC 16/89) . This being the case, it is further submitted that decisions on the question are unlikely to be successful unless an appellant can show that a test was incorrectly interprcted4 , or that a particular ccnclusion of the Labour Court i~ perverse. or is one that cannot be justified Oli the basis of the evidence presented in the case5. There can be no doubt, therefore, that successful appeals on the question will be not only as scarce as dog's tears, but completely non-existent. This itself compounds the crisis of confiC:ence in the Labour Court's approach to this question.
The thud and final objection to the Labour Court's determination rf the crucial qucstio1 addressed in this article 1s t11at the Court has assumed a jurisdiction which the LR Act has not conferred on it. It ts not th~ province of the Coart to m2.ke or unmake a "worker" for the purposes of the Act. It rr.ust be re-cmphasised that this competence is the property of untons. Wr have already drawn attention to the Cotxt's role in this matter. Th~re may be an argument that it was not the legislative intent that all manner of worktng people bcnefiL from the prov tsxons of tne LR Act. If indCF'Althis argument is sustainab l~, then it is equall) important to tndicate here that it is not the province of the Court to fill Jn this lacuna in the Act. Parliament had for reasons best known to itself, defined "worker" and "employee" differentl y in different enactments. '1 he jurisdicuon conferred on the Court in tile LR Act is limited to issues concerning the "worker", not the "enployee'. If Parliament intended to make L1c "worl:er's" ccmmor. law cousin th, "employee", 1t would ha"e done so expressly. If Parliament considers that it has created a Frankeinstein monster out of the current "worker", it is Parliament alone which is competent to shear the concept of its undesirable quali' ies. The Labour Coun si~ou ld not arrogate to itself the competence to perform this t.ask . There must remain a strt(;l separation of powers between the legislature and the jucticiary.
